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Abstract 
 
 
On April 22 and 23, 2004, a diverse group of 14 policymakers, modelers, analysts, and scholars met 
with some 22 members of the Sandia National Laboratories staff to explores ways in which the relationships 
between modelers and policymakers in the energy and environment fields (with an emphasis on energy) could be 
made more productive for both. This report is not a transcription of that workshop, but draws very heavily on its 
proceedings. It first describes the concept of modeling, the varying ways in which models are used to support 
policymaking, and the institutional context for those uses. It then proposes that the goal of modelers and 
policymakers should be a relationship of mutual trust, built on a foundation of communication, supported by the 
twin pillars of policy relevance and technical credibility. The report suggests 20 guidelines to help modelers 
improve the relationship, followed by 10 guidelines to help policymakers toward the same goal. 
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Modelers and Policymakers: Improving the 
Relationship 
Executive Summary 
On April 22 and 23, 2004, a diverse group of 14 policymakers, modelers, analysts, 
and scholars met with some 22 members of the Sandia National Laboratories staff to 
explores ways in which the relationships between modelers and policymakers in the 
energy and environment fields (with an emphasis on energy) could be made more 
productive for both. This report is not a transcription of that workshop, but draws very 
heavily on its proceedings. 
A model is a representation of a physical (or social, or both) system (including 
objects—and possibly people—and processes) that in some way simulates the behavior of 
the system. Although models may be kept in the head or on paper, and mentally or hand 
(pencil, calculator) operated, the emphasis in this report is on models large and complex 
enough to require running on a computer. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that 
computational models are based on human concepts about how the represented systems 
work, and get their data (usually) from human sources. For policymaking uses, what 
counts in the end is the human analysis, which may be based only in part on the outputs of 
the model. This report uses the term “model” as shorthand for the combined modeling and 
analysis activity. 
Models may be used for many purposes, but this report focuses on their 
applications in support of public policymaking. These may include: 
•Predictions for cost/benefit or cost/effectiveness analysis; 
•Understanding complex relationships—and the uncertainties--in problem 
variables; 
•Exploring a range of scenarios; 
•Building a framework for discussion, group learning, or negotiation; 
•Postponing difficult decisions; 
•Finding a “scientific” answer to politically controversial issues; 
•Building a rationale for a policy already chosen. 
Models used in support of policymaking are, almost by definition, embedded in a political 
process. It is important for all involved to acknowledge the goals, constraints, and 
incentives the political context implied in each case.  
In addition, it is important to recognize that modeling (along with the 
accompanying analyses) is likely to be just one of many inputs into the policymaking 
process—and perhaps only a minor one at that. Even so, modeling has the potential to 
enhance the process by improving understanding of the possible consequences of policy 
choices, deepening policymakers’ comprehension of the underlying problems and issues, 
clarifying decision-makers’ assumptions and values helping to build understandable 
6
  
 
narratives (“stories”) in support of policy proposals, informing dialogue among 
stakeholders and policymakers, or providing a framework for negotiation and consensus 
building. 
Policymakers are more likely to make use of analyses that come from modelers 
whom they have come to trust. By virtue of the client-specialist relationship, the burden of 
trust building falls primarily on the side of the modelers. They need, first of all, to 
communicate well with the policymakers. The policymaker trusts the modeler when the 
latter has shown that he or she can produce modeling and analyses that are both relevant to 
the former’s needs and technically credible. Table 1 summarizes a set of guidelines that 
modelers might follow to improve their relationships with policymakers. 
 
Table 1: 20 Guidelines for Modelers 
Guidelines for Enhancing 
Communication
Guidelines for Establishing Credibility
1. Accept the burden of effort. 12. Pay attention to reputation. 
2. Understand the context. 13. Don’t overreach 
3. Explain Clearly. 14. Acknowledge data limitations. 
4. Attempt continuing dialogue. 15. When predicting, show track record. 
Guidelines for Being Relevant 16. Simpler is better. 
5. Find the relevant audience. 17. Make models and analyses transparent  
6. Address the purpose. 18. Include factors that audiences cares about 
7. Address the salient questions. 19. Get reviews (peer and/or stakeholder) 
8. Focus on the problem, not the 
model. 
20. Compare and Collaborate 
9. Don’t assume the impossible.  
10. Tell a story that makes sense.  
11. Recognize time constraints.  
 
Although the burden of communication and trust building falls on the modelers, 
policymakers have an interest in getting the best products and services for their time and 
money. Therefore, Table 2 summarizes the report’s proposed guidelines for policymakers 
to make the best use of modeling. 
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Table 2: 10 Guidelines for Policymakers 
Guidelines for Improving Communication Guidelines for Getting More Credible 
Analyses
1. Explain the purpose. 7. Understand the limitations 
2. Don’t withhold essential information. 8. Help make the data available. 
3. Meet frequently  9. Get reviews. 
Guidelines for Getting More Relevant 
Analyses
10. Get comparisons. 
4. Involve the modelers earlier rather than 
later. 
 
5. State the issues and concerns clearly.  
6. Support capacity building.  
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Introduction 
What is a Model? 
This report concerns the uses of models to support making decisions about public 
policy, particularly energy policy. But what is a “model”? Table 3 offers six definitions 
from various sources. No one of these alone seems satisfactory, but together they provide 
a collection of attributes that add up to a useful description. A model  
 is a representation of a physical (or social, or both) system (including 
objects—and possibly people—and processes) that in some way simulates 
the behavior of the system; 
 may consist of a mentally manipulated set of concepts, a physical system, a  
mathematical description,  a computer program, or some combination of 
these; 
 may analyze (or solve) a problem, increase understanding of the system it 
simulates, forecast future states of that system, or predict the outcomes of 
measures taken to change the system. 
 Although models may be kept in the head or on paper, and mentally or hand 
(pencil, calculator) operated, the emphasis in this report is on computational models—
9
Table 3: What is a Model? Some Definitions 
A system of postulates, data, and inferences presented as a 
mathematical description of an entity or state of affairs. 
Merriam-Webster Online 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/)
A schematic description of a system, theory, or phenomenon that 
accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be used for 
further study of its characteristics: a model of generative grammar; 
a model of an atom; an economic model. 
YourDictionary.com (http://www. 
YourDictionary.com) 
 
A simplified version of something complex used, for example, to 
analyze and solve problems or make predictions. 
Encarta World English Dictionary 
(http://www.Encarta.com)  
A representation of reality used to simulate a process, understand a 
situation, predict an outcome, or analyze a problem. A model is 
structured as a set of rules and procedures, including spatial 
modeling tools that relate to locations on the Earth’s surface. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
Mid-Atlantic Integrated Assessment 
Glossary 
(http://www.epa.gov/maia/html/glossa
ry.html#m ) 
A way to represent a system for the purposes of reproducing, 
simplifying, analyzing, or understanding it. The standard 
representation in the Renewable Resource Data Center is the 
computer model, but models can be made of any substance such as 
clay, paper, abstract mathematics, or concepts.  
National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory  Glossar,y of Solar 
Radiation Resource Terms 
(http://rredc.nrel.gov/solar/glossary/gl
oss_m.html)  
A representation of a set of components of a process, system, or 
subject area. A model is generally developed for understanding, 
analysis, improvement, and/or replacement of the process. 
General Accounting Office, BPR 
Glossary of Terms 
(http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/bpra
g/bprgloss.htm#sectM )
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those large and complex enough to require running on a computer. It is nevertheless 
important to keep in mind that computational models are based on human concepts about 
how the represented systems work, and they get their data (usually) from human sources. 
Humans select the questions posed to the models and interpret the results. 
How Are Models Used?1
Models may be used as tools to support public policy making (as well as for 
helping the making of decisions by non-governmental institutions), but they have other 
applications that do not relate directly to policymaking. Scientists may use models to 
increase their understanding of phenomena they are studying. Engineers may use models 
to design machines or structures that will perform in desired ways. Educators or trainers 
may use simulations to give their students the “feel” of a work environment (e.g., an 
airplane in flight, or a business situation). Military organizations may use simulations not 
only to train soldiers in the use of equipment, but to give experience in military decision-
making. 
As do the military, policymakers also sometimes use models to support training 
that gives practice or experience. Policy games (as opposed to war games) may help teach 
officials (and perhaps members of other organizations who interact with them) how the 
policy process works—who communicates to whom about what, and how decisions get 
made. Or, such games may increase the participants experience in dealing with difficult 
issues, where the focus is not on finding the “correct” policy answers, but on learning to 
cope with policy challenges competently and creatively. 
More often, however, models are part of analytic efforts intended to improve 
policy decisions. “Public policy” consists (roughly) of governmental intentions, decisions, 
actions, laws, regulations and edicts. There are several ways in which models can be used 
to support public policymaking in general and energy policymaking in particular. The 
most obvious application is in the direct analysis and evaluation of possible policy 
choices. In this application, the model generates predictions about the outcomes of choices 
under consideration. For example, the model might predict that if legislation set a new 
corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standard at x miles per gallon of gas, then by 
the year 2nnn, national consumption of gasoline would be y gallons per year less than if 
the current standard were retained. Predictions might be made about the cost of changing 
the CAFE standard compared with the costs of alternative methods of achieving the same 
reduction in consumption (cost/effectiveness analysis.) Or, predictions might be made 
about both the cost of imposing the standard and the benefit of the expected reduction in 
consumption (cost/benefit analysis.) 
Accurate predictions about the future—and about policy attempts to affect the 
future—would be nice to have, but can we really get them?  Scholars have argued that for 
systems as complex as the environment, accurate predictions (especially long-term ones) 
                                                          
1 For another review of how forecasting (with an emphasis on models) is used, see Paul. P. Craig, et. al., “What Can History Teach 
Us? A Retrospective Examination of Long-Term Energy Forecasts for the United States,”  Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 2002. 27:83–
118 . Available at http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.energy.27.122001.083425.  
0
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are highly unlikely.2 When the complexities of technological change and human social, 
economic, political behavior are added in, achieving accurate predictions seems even more 
implausible. Most energy policy issues heavily involve environmental interactions, 
technological development, and human behavior.3  
Even if accurate predictions are unattainable, it can still be argued that models can 
help policymaking in various other ways. One possible use is to increase understanding of 
relationships among important variables in the system of interest. Models may give 
policymakers an improved grasp of what goes up and what goes down, and why—even if 
accurate quantitative predictions are not possible. Unexpected modeling outcomes may 
suggest possible unintended consequences not previously considered. Sensitivity analyses 
may show what factors are most important: do small changes in some variables lead to big 
changes in desired outcomes, or do large changes in other factors have only marginal 
consequences? Note, though, that “understanding the relationships” still implies a degree, 
even if a very relaxed one, of prediction. Policymaking, after all, is about trying to affect 
the future: to maintain or improve on the status quo of public wellbeing. (Or even, if one is 
cynical about it, to maintain or advance the public official’s political position.) The reason 
a policymaker would want to better understand the relationships relevant to some issue 
would be to improve his or her ability to estimate the consequences of policy decisions. 
Some styles of policymaking, however, may use only a very loose form of 
prediction: exploration of a wide range of possible futures, without an attempt to identify 
the most or least probable among them. This is the idea behind the “scenario planning” 
method policymaking, in which organizations attempt to identify adaptive strategies that 
will be “robust” or “resilient” however the future turns out.4 A team at the Rand 
Corporation has argued that quantitative modeling can support the scenario planning 
method.5 Still, some degree of prediction is implied. Rough probability distributions of a 
range of possible outcomes may offer at least some reduction of the uncertainty under 
which decisions must be taken. 
Even if models do not greatly increase policymakers’ abilities to predict the future, 
they may at the very least improve their understanding of what is known and what is 
uncertain. Mental models, which all policymakers use either explicitly or implicitly, may 
be necessary, but they are subject to certain problems. Some (or many) of the mental 
modelers’ assumptions about how the world works may be implicit and unexamined. The 
“running” of the model in policymakers’ heads may or may not be internally consistent 
from one case to the next. The underlying reasoning leading to the policymakers’ 
2 See, for example, Daniel Sarewitz, “Science and Environmental Policy: An Excess of Objectivity,”  Columbia University Center for 
Science, Policy, and Outcomes, at http://www.cspo.org/products/articles/excess.objectivity.html.  
3 In cases where the system modeled is (relatively) closed, predictions may be more reliable. Models have been used to reconstruct 
catastrophic events like airplane crashes, helping to determine causes and leading indirectly to changes in regulated hardware or 
procedures that seem likely to avoid such causes in the future.  
4 See the Global Business Network at http://www.gbn.org/AboutScenariosDisplayServlet.srv. On the other hand, there is only 
selective anecdotal evidence that the scenario planning method leads to any better outcomes (in terms of decision-makers’ goals) 
than any other decision method. See Clare Harries, “Correspondence to what? Coherence to what? What is good scenario-based 
decision making?” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 70 (2003) 797-817. 
5 Robert J. Lempert, Steven W. Popper, Steven C. Bankes, Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, 
Long-Term Policy Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), available at  
http://www.rand.org/cgi-bin/Abstracts/ordi/getabbydoc.pl?doc=MR-1626.  
  
 
1
conclusions may be difficult to explain. Psychological biases and cognitive limitations 
may undermine the logical application of the model.6 Building a formal model (whether in 
words, mathematical formulae, or computer programs), on the other hand, can ameliorate 
these problems. It forces identification of assumptions, specification of logical relations 
and procedures. The model should return the same results no matter who runs it 
(assuming, of course, the same inputs). At least if well documented, the model is 
explicable to others and examinable by others. It can provide a framework for discussion 
of what is known and what is not known about the system it represents. 
Indeed, providing a framework for discussion can become the primary function of 
a model. When stakeholders and policymakers are involved in early stages of model 
design, development, and use, the model can become a tool by which they discuss their 
points of view, interests, and assumptions. Discussion of model relationships and data can 
give those involved a common language and focus of analysis. Sandia National 
Laboratories worked with The Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly (a non-governmental 
organization) to develop a hydrologic-ecologic-economic model of New Mexico water 
resources that could be used in long-term planning. The model builders concluded that  
Perhaps the most important role of the model in the planning process was in 
promoting, initiating, and informing dialogue. In many cases the dialogue arose 
simply from the process of exploring the impacts of alternative water conservation 
measures. Participants were naturally drawn to offer their “what if” scenarios for 
testing. This led to questions and discussions of the pros and cons of the different 
alternatives. In many cases the questions led to discussions lasting weeks and months, 
which often led to greater understanding and clarity. These discussions often helped 
participants consider the broader, system-wide implications of proposed actions.7
Certainly the modelers strove for at least roughly accurate prediction of the 
consequences of proposed policy alternatives (and appear to have achieved good “post-
diction” of recent phenomena), but in any case the model permitted dialogue to be based 
on the best (commonly agreed) knowledge available of what the future might bring. In 
addition, the model could be used to educate the general public about the complexity of 
the water system, permitting graphical, “what-if” experimentation with the variables. 
Participatory modeling can benefit those involved in building the model even when 
the completed model is not used as a communications framework. The very act of 
constructing a model requires learning, in a structured way, how the modeled system 
works. Thus the mental model that the participant leaves with may be more sophisticated 
and more reflective of the best knowledge on the subject—the analyst or policymaker 
becomes a more proficient expert himself. 
                                                          
6 On biases, See Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,” American 
Psychologist ,(September 2003), Vol. 58, No. 9, 697-720. On cognitive limitations, see James K. Doyle et. al., “Mental Models of 
Dynamic Systems,” at http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/SSPS/Faculty/Papers/27.pdf.  
7 Howard D. Passell, et. al., Cooperative Water Resources Modeling in the Middle Rio Grande Basin (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia 
National Laboratories), SAND2003-3653, December 2003, at  
http://www.waterassembly.org/pdfs4/Modeling%20SAND%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.   
2
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The Political Dimension 
A model may also contribute to the policymaking process by giving officials a 
clear and persuasive “story” about the course of action they propose that constituents and 
stakeholders accept. To give a simple example, the report of the Bush administration 
National Energy Policy Development Group opens with a graph derived from models 
forecasting U.S energy consumption through the year 2020, showing a large shortfall if 
U.S. energy production only continues to grow at recent rates.8 The document then argues 
for (among other things) various measures to increase production. 
Not only government officials, but private organizations (firms, associations, 
public interest groups) may use models to develop and tell a “story.” Whether 
commissioned by a governmental or a non-governmental organization, models are at risk 
of being designed and used to support pre-existing conclusions. And even if they are not, 
their association with a particular sponsor may put them under among opposing groups. 
As Craig et. al. point out,  
The technical quality of an analysis does not assure impact. Energy forecasts are 
carried out for a variety of reasons. They are commonly released in complex, 
sometimes sharply polarized, political environments with contending interests, 
sometimes with the ruling political mindset already made up. Greenberger et. al. 
reviewed 14 major energy studies undertaken in 1972 to 1982.. They found 9 to be 
highly controversial and politicized in their execution, reception, or use…The Ford 
Energy Policy project, initiated in 1972 and released in 1974, called forth plaudits as 
well as resentment and antagonism owing to its conclusions emphasizing the need for 
energy conservation to be driven by regulatory measures…The Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA) was stunned by the criticism of its first report 
(ERDA-48) released in 1975, which slighted conservation options and adopted a 
supply focus.9
A 1993 article by J. L. King and K.L. Kraemer goes even further, reporting that 
their study of the use of models in American federal policymaking found that  
…models were used because they were effective weapons in ideological, partisan, 
and bureaucratic warfare over fundamental issues of public policy. Those models that 
were most successful, as measured by the extent of their use, were those that had 
proven most effective in the political battles over what kinds of economic and 
domestic policy should be followed, whether Democrats or Republicans should get 
the credit, and which bureaucratic agencies would receive the power and funds to 
implement the policies. Successful combatants in the policy debates had to have 
strong models of their own, and moreover, they usually needed copies of the 
oppositions' models as well, in order to mount their offensive and defensive 
campaigns. Models in federal policy making were successful as a result of what we 
called "datawars" – the explicit use of model-based information in policy warfare.10
 
                                                          
8 http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/Overview.pdf 
9 Op. cit.  footnote 1, pp. 105-106. 
10 John L. King and  Kenneth L. Kraemer, “Models, Facts, and the Policy Process:The Political Ecology of Estimated Truth,” ((Center 
for Research on Information Technology and Organizations I.T. in Government ,University of California, Irvine), Paper 81, 1993, 
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/crito/government/81/.  
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Despite this seemingly harsh finding, the authors conclude that models can still be useful 
because they can clarify issues in debate, enforce a discipline of analysis and discourse, 
and give policymakers at least some indication (whether used or not) whether a particular 
policy is likely to produce outcomes within an acceptable range. They point out, however, 
that  
Models are not much use in times of ideological upheaval, simply because the 
decisions are based on beliefs rather than facts. Ideological policy makers appeal to 
their own versions of facts, and dismiss the facts of others as falsehoods. In this way, 
the fundamental assumptions of policy modeling are upended.11
Sometimes, models may be used not to make arguments, but to avoid arguments. 
For example, policymakers may cast a difficult decision as one for “science” to resolve: if 
the model predicts that certain criteria (say, of safety or environmental impact) will be 
met, then the proposed actions should be taken (or not). Alternatively, uncertainties in 
current models may provide a reason to postpone action, either to pass difficult decisions 
on to later policymakers or to avoid an action altogether by continuing the postponement 
indefinitely. 
Modeling in Context 
Models and scientific and technical analysis will rarely play a decisive role in 
policy issues in such complex areas as energy and the environment. This is partly because 
a high degree of predictive certainty is almost never possible. Indeed, additional research 
and modeling may actually decrease political consensus, because additional conflicting 
perspectives and information may be developed.12 Whether that happens or not, however, 
public policy decisions will be the product of many factors, including:  
 consumer values and behavior; 
 economic constraints; 
 public opinion and electoral politics; 
 stakeholder opinions and influence; 
 political coalitions; 
 existing laws and regulations; 
 legislative politics; 
 differing executive agency jurisdictions, perspectives, and interests; 
 personal perspectives, biases, attitudes, and styles of decision makers; 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 See Sarewitz, op.cit. footnote 2 
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 regional differences; and 
 international influences and obligations. 
While policymakers may make use of models in one or more of the ways described 
above, society’s processes for resolving conflicting values and interests are likely to 
remain more important. Indeed, Sarewitz argues that 
Even when science is alleged to have played a decisive role in resolving a policy 
dispute, as in the case of the international ban on production of chemicals that deplete 
stratospheric ozone, a closer look at the politics usually shows not that the science 
convinced policy makers to take the correct action, but that the science and the 
prevailing political interests fortuitously converged.13
 
Devising Guidelines for Modelers and Policymakers 
Although the potential contributions of modeling (and associated analysis) may be 
limited, governments, foundations, universities, and companies continue to invest 
considerable money and effort in constructing and using models. How can the most 
benefit be derived from those investments? That was the primary question for the 
workshop. Following are some guidelines for modelers and policymakers to consider 
using to foster a more productive modeler/analyst-policymaker relationship. 
Box 1: “Modelers” or “Analysts”? 
The topic of the workshop reported here was the uses of modeling for policymaking, particularly in the 
area of energy policy. An important observation stressed repeatedly at the workshop was that models 
(whether mental or computational) are tools of analysis, and that the most important issues concern the 
relationship between analysts, rather than modelers, and policymakers. That certainly makes sense. 
However, when analysts do employ models (and here we mean more than just implicit or verbally 
described mental models), the analyst-policymaker relationship does take on additional features—such 
as the models processing much more complex and perhaps numerous scenarios than a mental operation
could. Therefore, although many of the guidelines to follow would apply to analysts (or policymakers 
receiving analyses) whether they used models or not, several would apply only in the cases where 
models played a significant role. For convenience, this report will use the term “modeler” most often, 
even though it may be more accurately referring to “modeler-analysts” or “analysts who use models.” 
The larger set of recommendations is directed at the modelers (see Box 1). This is 
probably as it should be. First, modelers are usually providers of goods and services, while 
policymakers are usually customers or clients. It is generally up to the provider to attempt 
to meet the needs of the consumer, and not vice-versa. Moreover, the modeler’s primary 
job is building and running the model, doing the analysis, and communicating the results 
to the appropriate audience. The policymaker, in contrast, is likely using the modeling and 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
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analysis as only one input into a broader policy process (see the previous section on 
“Modeling in Context”). He or she has not only a much wider range of actors to deal with 
than just the modeler, but probably has a great many more issues to be concerned with 
than just those addressed by the particular modeler. It therefore behooves the modeler to 
take on the larger burden of the communication between the two. 
Even so, it is in the interests of the policymaker to be an informed and active 
consumer. Doing so increases his or her chances of getting a useful product from the 
modeler. Therefore, this report also includes a set of guidelines for policymakers to 
consider as they interact with modelers. 
Guidelines: Some General Concepts 
The guidelines to follow were derived mainly from the insightful discussions of 
the workshop participants. The way in which the guidelines are presented here, however, 
is based on a conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1.  
• Figure 1: Trust Founded on Communication 
 
Modeling and the analyses derived from it are more likely to have an effect on the 
policy process when they come from a source that the policymakers (or influential 
stakeholders) have come to trust. They believe that the model and analyst have dealt fairly 
with their values and concerns, have used good data, and have employed sound methods. 
A modeler’s strong reputation may incline the policymaker toward trust, but a trusting 
relationship will likely have to be built with experience.  
A pervasive theme of the workshop was the importance of good communication 
between modelers and policymakers. It is the basic requirement for building a trusting 
relationship, and symbolized as the foundation of trust in the figure. Communication, 
however, constitutes the process, rather than the substance of the relationship—the “how” 
rather than the “what.” The two pillars in the figure—the “what”—are relevance and 
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credibility. “Relevance” means that the policymaker gets analysis that addresses the 
questions that concern him or her, and gets it in a usable form. “Credibility” means that 
the model and associated analysis are scientifically and technically believable. 
20 Guidelines for Modelers 
Guidelines for Enhancing Communication 
1. Accept the burden of effort. 
As noted above, analyses (and the models they may be based on) are only one 
factor policymakers have to consider, and analysts are only one of many people with 
whom they interact. Policymakers have little time to think about the quality of their 
communication with analysts; analysts need to figure out how to communicate about their 
work most effectively to the policymakers. Do not be tempted to think that your work 
begins with building (or adapting) a model and ends with analyzing the output. If you 
want your work to have impact, you also need to consider communication an integral part 
of your work, not an afterthought. 
2. Understand the context. 
As noted earlier (in the section, “How Are Models Used?”) models can be used in 
a variety of ways to support policymaking. Try to comprehend how the modeling and 
analysis will be used. Do homework. Ask questions. Get as clear a definition of the 
problem as possible (this may include helping policymakers reformulate their initial 
questions). Characterize what will be considered “success.” 
As described above (in the section on “Modeling and Context”), the policymaking 
process is a complex one, in which modeling and analysis play only one role, frequently a 
minor one. Identify the legal, political, institutional, and economic constraints under which 
policies must be made. Understand the role the model and analysis will play in the larger 
policy process—what else besides the analyses will influence the decision. Learn where 
the policymaker you are working sits in the process, and what he or she can or cannot 
affect. 
3. Explain Clearly. 
Policymakers need a story both that they can understand and that they can 
communicate to others in the policy process. This may mean a coherent narrative—“this 
happens, then that happens, then the result is…” Such “stories” are easier to grasp, 
remember, and retell than long, complex chains of reasoning interspersed with masses of 
data. Visualization tools—clear graphic representations of data, illustrations of processes, 
and metaphorical images may help. 
One workshop participant suggested the “mother” test—see if you can 
communicate the message to an intelligent but non-expert listener. Like that listener, the 
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policymaker probably does not want to deal with opaque jargon and obscure complexities. 
Remember that your job is to make the policymaker smart, not to show her how smart you 
are. 
4. Attempt continuing dialogue.  
Mutual feedback is better than an interview at the beginning and a briefing at the 
end. Dialogue at the beginning can clarify objectives and expectations (see Guideline 2 
above). Beyond inviting the policymaker to clearly state the questions he would like 
answered, the modeler may be able to help reformulate the questions in ways that lead to 
more useful answers. Dialogue in the course of a project can give the modeler feedback 
about whether expectations are being met and can increase the policymaker’s 
understanding of what is going into the model and the analysis. 
In the case of a policymaker contracting for a piece of analysis, the modeler may 
find it difficult to get much of the policymaker’s time. Try. At least ask for a 
knowledgeable representative with whom to meet regularly. 
In some cases, the major purpose of a model is to provide a framework for 
discussion, mutual learning, and negotiation among a group of policymakers or 
stakeholders. Then, dialogue about the model may have to consume as much, or even 
more, of the modeler’s time than the technical details of constructing and running the 
model.  
 
Guidelines for Being Relevant 
5. Find the relevant audience. 
As one workshop participant put it, if the policymaker is going to use the 
modeler’s work, she has to know about it first. A modeler who understands the policy 
context for his or her work (see Guideline 2) has a better chance of identifying the 
policymakers for whom it will be relevant. Publishing, speaking, and attending meetings 
in the field of interest should increase the chances of the policymakers hearing about the 
work. A policymaker may contract for a modeling job directly, or the policymaker-
modeler relationship may not directly be a financial one. In either case, the modeler, to put 
it bluntly, needs to do market research to identify those most in need of his services and 
then do marketing to let the potential “customer” know how he can help. 
6. Address the purpose. 
Be clear about what purposes are being served. As noted above, models and 
analysis can serve a variety of purposes in the policymaking process. Possible purposes 
include: 
 predictions for cost/benefit or cost/effectiveness analysis; 
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 understanding complex relationships—and the uncertainties—in problem 
variables; 
 exploring a range of scenarios; 
 building a framework for discussion, group learning, or negotiation; 
 postponing difficult decisions; 
 finding a “scientific” answer to politically controversial issues; or 
 building a rationale for a policy already chosen. 
It might be argued that it does not matter which of the purposes the modeler signs 
up for, as long as he or she shapes the work to the purpose. That is a major determinant of 
making it relevant to the policymaker.  
Some argue, however, that modelers need to confront ethical problems shared with 
all those who offer scientific support to policymaking. First is the tension between science 
and politics; second is the resisting pressures or temptations to tailor the model and 
analysis to produce the desired conclusions.  
Science-PoliticsTensions14
Most environmental and energy issues are multivariate, complex, nonlinear, and 
involve both physical systems and human behavior. Science seeks to increase 
understanding of these phenomena but is—some argue—unlikely to produce meaningful 
predictions that would permit controlling them. Policymakers, on the other hand, 
frequently want predictions that will help them build consensus on actions attempting to 
affect the future. The record suggests scientific prediction for policymaking, at least in the 
environmental area, has not been particularly successful. For example, a great deal has 
been spent on the research feeding the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, but many uncertainties remain, as does much political controversy on what 
actions, if any, to take. The current policy of the U.S. is to conduct further research in 
hopes of more conclusive predictions. 
If predictions (such as those sought by policymakers attempting to conduct cost-
benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses) are not really feasible, should modelers accept 
projects whose goal is prediction? In the 1980s, the National Acid Rain Precipitation 
Assessment Program was conducted with the purpose of producing findings on which to 
base a national program to limit the sources and ameliorate the effects of acid rain. 
Instead, although much scientific research was conducted, no timely policy prescriptions 
emerged from the program; policies were adopted without its direct input.15
                                                          
14 The argument in this sub-section is drawn from Sarewitz, op. cit. footnote 2 and from  Daniel Sarewitz, Roger A. Pielke, Jr., and 
Radford Byerly, Jr., eds., Prediction: Science, Decision Making, and the Future of Nature  (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2000). 
See also Roger A. Pielke, Jr., “The Role of Models in Prediction for Decision,” 6 September 2001, at 
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2001.12.pdf.  
15 Charles Herrick, “Predictive Modeling of Acid Rain: Obstacles to Generating Useful Information,” in Sarewitz, et. al., op. cit. 
footnote 14. 
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Biasing the Outcome 
For perhaps all but the most mercenary modeler, tailoring a model and associated 
analysis to produce only the desired results would probably be ethically out of bounds. But 
the problem of bias may not always be starkly clear.  
For example, a policymaker believes that an “honest” model will produce results 
that support her preferred policy position. If the modeler knows this to be the situation (or 
even if she does not), does producing the expected results necessarily mean that the 
modeler has performed in a biased or unethical way? 
Any model of a real system will inevitably require simplifications, assumptions 
about uncertain factors and data, and focus on some questions at the expense of others. 
These may all introduce biases towards a particular outcome or range of outcomes. On the 
other hand, attempting to change them to counteract the biases may simply introduce 
biases in another direction. 
Finally, complex environmental and energy issues will likely be subject to many 
uncertainties, with diversity of scientific opinion and debates about what is “true.” 
Whenever the results of the modeling coincide with the predilections of the sponsor, there 
will be the risk of suspicions of made-to-order science.  
7. Address the salient questions. 
Within the general purpose of a modeling study, policymakers will have specific 
substantive questions to be answered about the issue at hand. The elements of identifying 
what will be salient may be found in the guidelines above on understanding the context, 
engaging in continuing dialogue, finding the relevant audience, and addressing the 
purpose. But identifying what is salient needs to be followed by framing the modeling, 
analysis, and reporting to actually produce results that policymakers will be perceive as 
useful. 
8. Focus on the problem, not the model.  
Don’t let the tool become the end in itself. Provide information to help the 
policymaker work the problem, not to show how wonderful the model is. The danger to 
the modeler is to become wrapped up in the cleverness or beauty of the methodology and 
to lose sight of purpose and relevance. Don’t let the model you happen to have already 
become a hammer looking for a nail. Also recognize that sometimes a computerized 
model is not necessary or appropriate for the level of decision involved. Remember that it 
is the analysis that counts, not the model. 
9. Don’t assume the impossible. 
Model scenarios that stray too far from the bounds of the economically and 
politically feasible may result in ignored analyses. This is another reason for Guideline 2, 
“Understand the Context.” Conclusions that are too far from accepted wisdom may be 
rejected as irrelevant or not credible.  
0
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The modeler does have a dilemma here. One the one hand (unless they are merely 
trying to bolster their preconceived notions), policymakers do not want to waste time and 
money on analyses that just tell them what they already know. On the other hand, 
excessively unconventional findings or policy options that seem totally infeasible are 
likely to be dismissed—and the rest of the analysis may be dismissed along with them. An 
example cited at the workshop was an energy policy study that suggested the option of 
substantial tax increases on gasoline—a political non-starter that led to dismissal of the 
entire study. 
10. Tell a story that makes sense. 
The presentation of the model output (and other analytic efforts) should be in the 
form of a coherent story (that can be retold), not disjointed pieces of information. This is 
important not only for the sake of clear communication between modeler and policymaker 
(Guideline 3 above). It is also important for the policymaker’s ability to communicate 
clearly and persuasively with other players in the policy process.  
11. Recognize time constraints. 
Since policy decisions are based on many inputs, with modeling being only one, a 
situation often arises where the best technical analysis possible within the time constraints 
is welcomed.  Be clear from the beginning about what can and cannot be accomplished in 
the time allotted. Analysis that comes after decisions are made may be irrelevant or 
unwelcome.  The modeler must carefully weigh the risks and rewards in such situations. 
Hasty analyses could later be characterized as faulty, damaging reputations. The modeler 
should consider whether the policymaker understands the limitations of the analysis and 
will use the analysis prudently. 
Guidelines for Establishing Credibility 
12. Pay attention to reputation. 
Policymakers listen to those whom they trust. This trust may be based in part on 
past experience with the analysts, on word of mouth about them, or on their professional 
reputation. Obviously, it would be better if the policymaker had had previous positive 
experiences with the modeler, but this is not always possible—there always has to be a 
first time. 
One way to be seen as trustworthy is to conduct processes that seem fair and 
aredesigned to counter bias. Openness about limitations (Guidelines 13 and 14), 
transparency (Guideline 17), and review processes (Guideline 19) may help. 
In studies where multiple, diverse stakeholders are involved in developing the 
model from the beginning, those stakeholders may come to trust in the fairness of the 
process. If those outside the process see that diverse stakeholders were monitoring each 
others’ input, they, too, may see the work as more credible. 
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On the other hand, even very scientifically sound studies are subject to being seen 
as biased and not credible if they have been sponsored by organizations with known 
interests at stake.16 A lack of scientific consensus over the issues involved will increase 
the likelihood of challenges to credibility.17 The prevailing political environment will 
greatly affect how this phenomenon plays out. 
13. Don’t overreach 
Sometimes modelers try to use existing models beyond or outside the purposes for 
which they were designed. Even modeling carefully tailored to the purpose at hand risk 
omitting significant outliers that are just not quantifiable—such as high-impact, single 
instance events like wars or terrorist acts. Long-range forecasts are already difficult, but 
especially vulnerable to unpredictable outliers. 
Models are by their nature distortions and simplifications of reality (otherwise they 
would be reality). Explain what is represented, what is left out, and why. Acknowledge 
your model’s limits. Note the major simplifications. Spell out assumptions that may have a 
substantial impact on results. Overselling a model or concealing its limitations undermines 
credibility.  
14. Acknowledge data limitations. 
The most relevant and up-to-date data are not always available. Drawing 
conclusions from inadequate data risks loss of credibility.  Use sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis to better understand data limitations.  Consider making recommendations for 
activities to improve the quality of important data for future uses. 
15. When predicting, show track record. 
When predictions (or, in weaker form, an explanation of likely trends and 
relationships among variables) are offered, the ability of the model (computational or 
mental) to explain the past lends credibility. It does so even more when it was actually 
used in the past to predict a future that came true. This is rare. Moreover, past results do 
not always indicate future performance. First, predictions may turn out to be accurate, but 
for the wrong reasons. If the model incorrectly simulates the underlying process, the same 
luck probably will not hold in the future. Second, even if the process was modeled 
correctly in the past, conditions in complex systems can change enough so that the same 
model cannot accurately predict outcomes for later periods.  
As noted above (p. 10), there is a school of thought that says that predictions of 
complex environmental phenomena, as well as those that contain a large human 
behaviorial component, are not really feasible. Modelers agreeing with this position will 
probably not want to offer predictions in the first place. The problem is that policymakers 
                                                          
16 See quotation from Craig et. al. above on page 13. 
17 Cf. William Clark et. al., “Information as Influence: How institutions mediate the impact of scientific assessments on global  
environmental affairs,” (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2002) Faculty 
Research Working Papers Series No. RWP02-044, available at http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/.  
2
  
 
2
frequently want numbers. One answer is to explain the limitations of models (see 
Guideline 13), then “… project rough trade-offs between competing objectives, using 
sensitivity and uncertainty analyses to check for robustness of conclusions.”18
16. Simpler is better. 
A large, complex, very detailed model structure with many interactions may be 
technically impressive, but no better at making predictions or offering insight into 
relationships than a simpler approach. Models with detailed data but with an overly 
complext structure may not be very helpful. False precision should not be confused with 
predictive accuracy. Masses of data may only confuse. 
17. Make models and analyses transparent (having traceable conclusions). 
A simpler model structure is also easier to make transparent (the opposite of a 
black box, whose inner workings are completely concealed from the user). Policymakers 
who understand how the model works may be more likely to trust the story it is used to 
tell. Transparency also facilitates comparisons of models with one another, which allows 
modelers to learn from one another by tracking differences in output to differences in 
assumptions, algorithms, and data. Full documentation is an important component of 
transparency, but also try to make the model explicable to non-experts in relatively simple 
terms. (At the same time, do not oversimplify or talk down to the policymaker.) 
18. Include factors that audiences care about. 
This is not just a matter of relevance—addressing what matters. It is also a matter 
of reassuring policymakers (or stakeholders) that their interests and values have been 
taken into account, and therefore that they can believe that the model is not biased against 
them. When the model building process itself is participatory (with stakeholders and 
policymakers involved), this kind of inclusiveness is explicit. Where only a single modeler 
(or modeling team) and a single policymaker are involved, they may have to draw on their 
understanding of the larger policy context to produce a model whose output will be seen 
as credible by other actors. External reviews (see Guideline 19) may help. 
A risk of building models with stakeholder and policymaker participation is that 
the need to build consensus might lead to oversimplifications or over-weighting of some 
factors, possibly reducing the technical validity of the model. 
19. Get reviews (peer and/or stakeholder) 
“Validation” of models, in the sense of testing their predictive abilities against 
long-term, real-world events, is rarely possible. Other means of assuring that they are 
providing the best possible (even if still limited) information are necessary. For models 
running in software, various software engineering verification tools (systematic developer 
                                                          
18 From a summary of a presentation by John Weyant, “Treatment of  Uncertainty in Integrated Assessments,” before  a meeting at 
the Aspen Global Change Institute, 1996, available at 
http://www.agci.org/publications/eoc96/AGCIEOC96SSSII/AGCIEOC96WeyantSSSII.html.  
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tests, alpha tests, beta tests) can be applied. In addition, however, the modelers may seek 
the peer reviews, in which outside experts render opinions on the assumptions, biases, 
methods, and data used in the models and analysis. Affected stakeholders might also 
conduct reviews, which may uncover either value biases or methodological shortcomings. 
20. Compare and Collaborate. 
Since 1976 the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum has provided a venue for 
modelers and policymakers to come together to compare and contrast models addressing 
the same problems. The process can illuminate the structure and parameters of the models, 
make modeler’s assumptions and biases more explicit, reveal model strengths and 
weaknesses, and enhance everyone’s insights in to the policy issues being addressed.19   
Policymakers do not want to be the arbiters of competing technical approaches: 
they are foremost interested in the policy issues, not the methodologies. However, when 
model comparisons can bring in policymakers as participants, the process can become a 
communications forum between modelers and policymakers. Both sides can appreciate the 
role of simplicity and transparency and the benefits of continuing dialogue. They can 
refine the appropriate frameworks for addressing particular issues. Finally, they can 
understand the underlying bases for agreements and disagreements among various parties 
on important issues. The least important part of the process is the detailed technical 
comparison of the estimates provided by the models. 
10 Guidelines for Policymakers 
Granted that the burden of effort in building a productive modeler-policymaker 
relationship is on the modelers’ side, there are things policymakers can do to ease the way, 
and it is in their interests to do so. 
Guidelines for Improving Communication 
1. Explain the purpose. 
If the modeler is going to tailor the modeling and analysis process to your 
objectives, he or she needs to know what they are. Analyses intended to produce specific 
predictions of policy outcomes (and you should probably be skeptical of these) will be 
different from those intended to explore scenario spaces or show trade-off relationships. 
Explain your goals for the modeling project and specify what a successful outcome will 
look like. This can be difficult if you do not know exactly what you want. Be prepared to 
engage in dialogue with the modeler to clarify things. 
                                                          
19 See H.G. Huntington et. al., “Modeling for Insights, not Numbers: The experiences of the Energy Modeling Forum, “OMEGA: THE 
International Journal of Management Science, Vol. 10 No. 5 (1982), pp. 449-462.          
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2. Don’t withhold essential information. 
Give modelers what they need to know about the larger policy context in which 
you will be using their results. In particular, if certain assumptions are simply 
unacceptable, or if certain options are just beyond the pale, it is better they know sooner 
rather than later. 
3. Meet frequently (or designate a representative who can). 
Perhaps easier said than done, but if the modeler just gets an initial discussion of 
your objectives and then must go off and figure out how to meet them without further 
guidance, disappointment may follow. Moreover, continuing interactions with the modeler 
may help you clarify your on thinking on the subject and help refine the questions to get 
more useful results. 
Guidelines for Getting More Relevant Analyses 
4. Involve the modelers earlier rather than later. 
Modelers sometimes feel that policymakers want instant answers to complex 
questions—and policymakers sometimes feel they are getting answers too late to be 
relevant to the policy process. Of course it is up to the modelers to meet their deadlines, 
but giving them enough time to study the problem, work it through, and develop analyses 
should result in a better product. Asking for instant answers to big, complicated problems 
will result in a worse product. Be prepared to make trade-offs between relevance and 
credibility if facing budget or schedule constraints. 
5. State the issues and concerns clearly. 
To get relevant results, explain what you see the relevant issues to be. Of course 
modelers and analysts are not decision-makers, but they will deliver more relevant results 
if they feel they can contribute something to the policy process. 
6. Support capacity building. 
At the workshop, this principle was jokingly phrased as “Modelers want a 
retainer.” Finding the money to support the continuing operations of a modeling group is, 
no doubt, usually difficult.20 Nevertheless, studies that draw on an up-to-date repository of 
substantive knowledge and modeling expertise are more likely to produce relevant 
analyses. In addition, this ongoing activity can be a source of “early warning” for you on 
trends and possibilities that you should be aware of. In contrast, only asking for—and only 
being willing to pay for—fast responses to urgent problems draws down intellectual 
capital and prevents its replenishment. A modeler at the workshop told of having been 
denied requested funding to study a particular issue. Two years later, the modeler was 
asked to provide a fast turn-around analysis on that very topic. 
                                                          
20 Maintaining an in-house capability, such as the Energy Information Administration, is one solution, but the exception rather than 
the rule. 
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Guidelines for Getting More Credible Analyses 
7. Understand the limitations 
Demand transparency in modeling and analyses, and become familiar with the 
assumptions and limitations. Try explaining the assumptions and limitations to the 
satisfaction of the modeler(s).  Ask for sensitivity analyses to show how assumptions 
affect outputs. Don’t expect more prediction than is reasonable.  
 8. Help make the data available. 
Sometimes the data that a modeler needs to do a credible job are difficult to come 
by. Or, the data is not available in formats the modeler can use. When you can bring 
government resources to bear on making the data available, do so. This may mean 
investing more in data collection, or more in “cleaning” it for modeling applications.  Be 
willing to invest in data collection for use in future decision-making. 
9. Get reviews. 
Reviews of the models used by external technical experts can reveal assumptions, 
biases, or limitations you should know about. Reviews by external policy specialists can 
expose weaknesses in arguments or evidence—or can put you on firmer ground in making 
use of the study’s results. 
10. Get comparisons. 
Policymakers may not often have the opportunity to put diverse modelers and 
analysts to work on the same problems. But at least they may be able to participate in, and 
perhaps join in sponsorship of, third-party efforts to carry out such comparisons. As with 
getting external technical reviews, such comparisons could lead to better understanding of 
the capabilities and limitations of the models used by the modelers they employ.  
Comparisons may also lead to better insight into the sensitivities of outcomes to modeled 
variables and into the inherent uncertainties in the problems under study.  
Conclusion 
Modeling can be a valuable way to bring scientific and technical knowledge to 
bear on problems of public policy. But for maximum value, the modelers and 
policymakers need to be aware not only of the technical issues they are commonly 
addressing, but also of the dynamics of their professional relationship. This can be 
especially difficult for the modelers, who may be more comfortable attending to the 
substance of the problems they are addressing and the tools of analysis they are applying. 
Nevertheless, if they want their work to have impact and contribute to the public good, 
they need to take on the burden of communicating and building trust with the 
policymakers. The policymakers, for their part, can make this process harder or easier.  
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Appendix I:  Visiting Workshop Participants 
Carl Bauer has served as Associate Laboratory Director at the National Energy Technology 
Laboratory (NETL) since July 1997. He heads the Office of Coal and Environmental Systems with 
responsibility for all of NETL’s activities related to coal and environmental research, including power 
systems advanced research, gasification and combustion technologies, CO2 sequestration and greenhouse 
gas management, and environmental and water resources. Previously, he served as associate laboratory 
director, Office of Product Management for Environmental Management, with responsibility for 
development and demonstration of hazardous and radioactive waste cleanup technologies. He has more than 
30 years of experience in technical and business management in both the public and private sectors. His 
positions at the Department of Energy headquarters have included director of the Division of Work for 
Others Agencies; director of the Idaho and Chicago Environmental Restoration Operations Division; acting 
director for the Environmental Management Office of Acquisition Management; and director of the Office 
of Technology Systems. 
Dean Brunton is Manager of Financial Assessment with Public Service Company of New Mexico 
(PNM) in Albuquerque. PNM is the largest electric and natural gas utility in the State of New Mexico. PNM 
also has non-utility businesses including wholesale power sales in the western US. He is responsible for 
economic and financial analysis of capital projects and corporate strategic initiatives. Previously he was 
manager of the Financial Planning and Gas Supply Planning departments with responsibility for modeling 
utility production and financial systems. He has also served as Risk Manager for natural gas trading 
operations.  He has an M.A. in economics from the University of New Mexico. 
Stephen R. Connors is Director of Analysis Group for Regional Electricity Alternatives (AGREA) 
at M.I.T.'s Laboratory For Energy And The Environment (LFEE). In July 2001, he  also became the 
coordinator of multidisciplinary research for the newly formed LFEE. In this role he has built on his 
expertise in integrated assessment research to develop and promote LFEE multidisciplinary research and 
outreach initiatives. AGREA's primary research focus is in strategic energy planning in electricity and the 
environment, with an emphasis on regional electric sectors. Fundamental to AGREA's approach is the use of 
electric sector planning tools within a multi-attribute tradeoff analysis framework. This approach 
automatically looks for cost-effective ways to attain multiple goals of cost-competitiveness and 
environmental quality, and also encourages public participation in the planning process via stakeholder 
interaction and input. 
John J. Conti is the Director of the International, Economic and Greenhouse Gases Division of the 
Energy Information Administration.  In this position, he is responsible for the publication of the 
International Energy Outlook, the Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States, the Voluntary 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, major sections of the Annual Energy Outlook, and various EIA service 
reports.  He is responsible for the macroeconomic forecasts used in the Annual Energy Outlook and the 
development of the System for the Analysis of Global Energy (SAGE), a model of worldwide energy supply 
and demand used to produce forecasts for International Energy Outlook.  For the past 23 years, he has held 
various positions in the Energy Information Administration and Office of Policy and International Affairs.  
His work has focused on economic, financial and systems analysis of energy systems with special emphasis 
on the electric power sector.  He has developed and used many energy models that the Department relies on 
to make energy projections.  He has a Master of Science degree in management and policy sciences and an 
undergraduate degree in economics from the State University of New York at Stony Brook.  
James K. Doyle is Associate Professor of Psychology, Social Science and Policy Studies 
Department, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, where he conducts research at the interface of psychology and 
computer modeling of social, economic, and environmental systems. He is interested in the effect of 
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computer simulation models on learning, mental models, and decision making, the relative effectiveness of 
alternate knowledge elicitation techniques, the effects of group processes on model building, and public 
understanding and acceptance of simulation modeling. He has a B.A. in Environmental Science from the 
University of California at Berkeley and a Ph. D. in Social Psychology from the University of Colorado at 
Boulder. 
 Alex Farrell is Assistant Professor in the Energy and Resources Group, University of California 
Berkeley, where he conducts research on energy and environmental technology, economics, and policy. 
More specifically, he is interested in the use of technical (i.e. scientific and engineering) information in 
policy-making, market-based environmental regulation (i.e. emission trading), the environmental impacts of 
energy, the application of sustainability in decision-making, security in energy systems, and alternative 
transportation fuels. He has a B.S. in Systems Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy and a Ph.D. in 
Energy Management and Policy from the University of Pennsylvania. His prior experience has been with 
Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Air Products and Chemicals, and the U.S. Navy. 
 Jill Halverson has for the past six years worked in the Albuquerque office of U.S. Senator Jeff 
Bingaman. She serves as his lead on economic development issues with special emphasis on Science and 
Technology. She is the Senator’s liaison to Sandia National Laboratories, the Air Force Research Lab and 
Kirtland Air Force Base. She also serves as the Senator’s representative to ten American Indian tribes, 
working with tribal leadership on issues including energy and infrastructure. Previously, she served for two 
years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in India, founded the Downtown Women’s Center (providing a day center 
and housing for homeless mentally ill women in Los Angeles), was Chief of Staff to a Los Angeles City 
Councilwoman, and served as Vice President and Manager of Community and Local Government Affairs 
for First Interstate Bank. She received a BA in English Literature from St. Cloud State, a Certificate in 
Entrepreneurial Studies from the Anderson School of Management at U.C.L.A., and an Honorary Doctorate 
from Loyola-Marymount University. 
   Hillard Huntington is Executive Director of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum, where he 
conducts studies to improve the usefulness of models for understanding energy and environmental problems. 
His current research interests are modeling electricity competition, natural gas markets, energy price shocks, 
and energy market impacts of environmental policies.  He was President of the United States Association for 
Energy Economics and Vice-President for Publications for the International Association for Energy 
Economics. He was also a member of the American Statistical Association's Committee on Energy Data and 
served on a joint USA-Russian National Academy of Sciences Panel on energy conservation research and 
development. 
Dan Metlay is a member of the Senior Professional Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical 
Review Board, an independent Federal agency charged with evaluating the technical and scientific validity 
of the Department of Energy’s high-level radioactive waste management program.  Before joining the 
Board, he taught organization theory and public policy at Indiana University, Bloomington, and at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  He was a research scientist at Brookhaven National Laboratory. He 
served on the staff of two Secretaries of Energy:  James Watkins and Hazel O’Leary. His publications 
include  “From Tin Roof to Torn Wet Blanket: Predicting and Observing Groundwater Movement at a 
Proposed Nuclear Waste Site” in Prediction: Science, Decision Making, and the Future of Nature, D. 
Sarewitz, R. A. Pielke, Jr., and R. Byerly, Jr., eds; and “Institutional Trust and Confidence: A Journey into a 
Conceptual Quagmire. in Social Trust and the Management of Risk, G. Cvetkovich and R. E. Lofstedt, eds. 
He received his B.S. degree in molecular biology and history from the California Institute of Technology 
and his Ph.D. in political science and public policy from the University of California, Berkeley. 
Shirley Neff is the Goldwyn International Strategies Senior Advisor for domestic energy practice 
and international oil, gas, and power. A nationally recognized expert in energy markets and energy policy, 
she served as staff economist for the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee from 1995-2003. She 
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has served as an economist for the Kansas Corporation Commission, Shell Oil Company, and an electric 
utility holding company in New England. She is on the Advisory Board of the Institute for Energy, Law & 
Enterprise at the University of Houston, and she is a Vice President of the U.S. Association for Energy 
Economics. 
Craig O’Hare is New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson’s Special Assistant for Renewable Energy 
in the Energy, Minerals, and Natural Resources Department. He is responsible for guiding the 
implementation of the Governor’s clean energy agenda, including: energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
alternative fuels, and the emerging promise of a hydrogen economy.  His particular focus is on the 
Governor’s goals of making state government a national leader in energy efficiency, meeting at least 10% of 
New Mexico’s electricity needs with renewable sources by 2010, and promoting the construction of 
environmentally sound buildings through Green Building initiatives. Previously, he worked for the City of 
Santa Fe’s Water Division for six years as the Water Programs Administrator. He was responsible for the 
Water Division’s media relations and public outreach, water conservation and efficiency programs, and 
drought emergency management. He also coordinated planning efforts with the Santa Fe National Forest on 
restoration of the fire-prone Santa Fe Watershed. Earlier work included serving as an Executive Assistant to 
a Tucson (AZ) City Councilmember and addressing water management for the Arizona Department of 
Water Resources. He has bachelor’s degrees in Business Economics and Geography from the University of 
California at Santa Barbara. 
Alison Silverstein  is Senior Energy Policy Advisor to the Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission. She has experience in the central issues involved in energy industry operations and 
restructuring. She was advisor to Chairman Wood when he headed the Public Utility Commission of Texas 
and was active in the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. During this period, the 
Texas Commission presided over the transformation of the state's electric industry into a sound competitive 
wholesale market as well as moving Texas' telecommunications industry to retail competition. She advised 
the Chairman on most facets of wholesale and retail market design. From 1984 to 1994, she held a number 
of positions with Pacific Gas &  Electric Co. in San Francisco, including supervisor of information and 
communications services and senior communication planner. She also served as an operations research 
analyst with the U.S. Department of the Interior in the 1970s. She  holds a master of business administration 
degree from Stanford University, an MSE in systems analysis and economics from The Johns Hopkins 
University and a bachelor of arts degree in economics from The Johns Hopkins University. 
Bob Wessely is serving his third year as Chair of the Water Assembly, organizing the regional 
water planning effort for the Middle Rio Grande Region—Sandoval, Bernalillo and Valencia Counties. This 
role included coordinating and blending the interdisciplinary issues in the regional water planning situation – 
including the political, public, hydrological, legal, modeling and funding aspects.  Prior to working in water 
issues, he co-founded SciSo, Incorporated in 1971 to provide expert consulting services on large scale 
scientific, engineering, and software systems, advising or developing systems concepts, requirements, 
design, implementations, testing and validation. He was responsible for business development and for the 
technical execution of systems engineering projects in support of commercial businesses and major 
government prime contractors.  HIs Ph.D. is in Theoretical Solid State Physics from Rutgers University 
Frances P. Wood is a Director with OnLocation, and has over twenty years of consulting 
experience with government and private clients. She has performed and managed numerous national energy 
and environmental policy analyses using integrated energy models such as IDEAS, NEMS, and POEMS. 
For many years she has managed assessments of DOE's energy efficiency and renewable programs using 
NEMS. Other policy analyses have included energy related legislative proposals and actions to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions. She has participated in analyses of electricity markets that include impacts of 
restructuring, electricity price forecasting, transmission usage and congestion, and environmental 
regulations. Before joining OnLocation in 1997, she was Director of Consulting for AES Corporation. She 
managed studies that focused on the investment criteria and market potential for non-utility generation, 
energy efficiency options, and integrated resource planning. She has an A.B. from Dartmouth College and a 
M.S. in Engineering Economic Systems from Stanford University. 
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Appendix II: Sandia Workshop Participants 
Arnold B. Baker is the Chief Economist. He serves as the primary strategic planning resource for 
the Energy & Infrastructure Assurance Business Unit, manages the Unit's economic and public policy 
analysis and modeling, and serves as economic and strategic planning advisor to Sandia Corporation. He is 
also the President Elect of the International Association for Energy Economics (2004) and former President 
of the United States Association (2002). He holds a BA in History and MA and Ph.D. degrees in economics 
from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Prior to joining SNL in 1996, he served for 17 
years at Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), holding a number of challenging positions including Director 
of Political Economic Analysis, Director of Public Issues, Director of Energy Market Analysis, and Manager 
of Strategic Planning (ARCO Oil and Gas Company). His assignments included market analysis and 
scenario based planning, as well as chairing internal planning studies on the future of the oil, natural gas, 
coal and electricity industries. Prior to joining ARCO he served at the U.S. Department of the Treasury as 
Special Assistant to the Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, and as a staff economist at the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission. 
David Borns is the manager of the Geotechnology and Engineering deparment. The focus of this 
department is the security, supply and storage of the nation's fossil energy systems. He joined Sandia in 1981 
after being a graduate student and member of the research faculty at the University of Washington. At 
Sandia, he has worked on the monitoring and performance assessment of geologic repositories for nuclear 
waste and environmental remediation. Dr. Borns has additional technical expertise in remote sensing and 
fiber-optic sensors for monitoring applications. 
Mark Boslough is a Member of the Technical Staff in the Evolutionary Computing and Agent-
Based Modeling Department. His background is in physics and geophysics, with an emphasis on 
computational modeling. His current projects include climate model development and genetic programming 
for robot behavior design. 
Nancy S. Brodsky is currently working within the infrastructure interdependency analysis team. 
She conducts studies and analyses in response to immediate needs of Dept. of Homeland Security. Research 
interests include applications of complexity science to infrastructure interdependencies and 
interrelationships between infrastructure disruptions and social response. Her previous work was primarily 
in laboratory rock mechanics and thermal rock properties in support of national nuclear waste isolation 
projects (WIPP and Yucca Mountain). B.S. in Geological Sciences, SUNY Binghamton; MS in Geology and 
PhD in Geophysics from Univ. of Colorado at Boulder. 
Theresa Brown has, in 10 years at Sandia, specialized in the analysis and modeling of 
infrastructure interdependencies; systems analysis for vulnerability assessments; probabilistic performance 
assessment; risk assessment; hydrogeology; and numerical modeling of atmospheric, unsaturated and 
saturated groundwater flow and transport. Her work has focused on conceptual model development and 
decision-making under uncertainty, using vulnerability and risk analyses and probabilistic performance 
assessments. Her recent activities have included leading the Dynamic Infrastructure Interdependency 
Simulation and Analysis (DIISA) team's development if a National Infrastructure Interdependency Model, 
the Seattle and Portland Port Operations and Port Economics Simulators, the California Oil Simulator; and 
performing scenario analyses using those simulators for the Department of Homeland Security, Department 
of Energy and Department of Defense. Her Ph.D. in Geology is from the University of Wisconsin. 
Peter B. Davies is the Director of the Geoscience and Environment Center with responsibility for 
Sandia’s geoscience capabilities work on hardened and deeply buried targets, U.S. Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, fossil energy exploration/production, environmental restoration, and fundamental geoscience 
research. He also has responsibility for transportation capabilities in package design, testing, analysis, and 
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risk assessment. He also serves as the coordinating Director for Sandia’s Water Initiative, managing a cross-
laboratory program focused on water safety, security and sustainability. Current projects in this initiative 
include research, development, and technical collaborations in water infrastructure security, real-time water 
monitoring, water treatment and desalination technology, and cooperative decision modeling. Work in this 
program is being extended to international settings (e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Israel) where growing tension over 
increasingly scarce water has high potential to undermine stability and precipitate conflict.  
Charles Hanley has been working in Sandia’s renewable energy programs since 1994. Previously, 
he led an internally-directed R&D project to develop a modeling and simulation package that projected 
policy decisions into the future of land use, traffic patterns, and mobile emissions in the Albuquerque region. 
In the renewable energy area, he managed international programs until 2002, overseeing the implementation 
of more than 400 remote solar and wind projects for rural uses in Mexico, Central, and South America.  
Since 2002, he has played a broader role in the systems-integration activities of Sandia’s solar programs, 
principally working with the Department of Energy to develop a new multi-year technical plan and to 
implement the DOE’s Systems-Driven Approach across the solar program.   
 Don Hardesty is the Deputy Director for Combustion and Industrial Technology at Sandia's 
Combustion Research Facility (CRF) in Livermore California. He provides programmatic leadership and 
line management for the CRF's applied energy research programs including Engines Combustion, Hydrogen 
and Combustion Technologies, and Remote Sensing and Energetic Materials. These programs address a rich 
customer mix including DOE, DoD, DHS, DP, NNSA, EPA and US Industry. He leads Sandia's broad 
initiative on Hydrogen Energy, with activities ranging from fundamental chemical and materials science of 
hydrogen storage, hydrogen production and energy conversion, to more applied work on engineered 
systems, safety, codes and standards, and systems analysis related to development of the US hydrogen 
infrastructure.  He holds s a PhD from the Aerospace and Mechanical Sciences Dept. at Princeton 
University. He notes that he is, in fact, trained as a rocket scientist, should we ever need one. 
Mike Hightower is a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in the Energy Security Center. 
He is a civil and environmental engineer with over 25 years experience in and research and development 
projects. This includes structural and geomechanics research in support of space and weapons systems, 
research and evaluation of innovative environmental technologies for industrial and nuclear waste treatment 
and cleanup, and security and protection of critical infrastructures. He  supports research and development 
projects addressing water and energy resource sustainability and water and energy infrastructure security and 
protection issues and concerns.  These efforts include developing novel water treatment and water 
monitoring technologies, developing models and techniques to improve water resource use and 
management, desalination and produced water treatment, impact of water availability on energy security and 
reliability, and water, electric power, and natural gas infrastructure security and protection.  He holds 
Bachelor and Master degrees in civil engineering from New Mexico State University. 
Scott Jones is a Principal Member of the Technical Staff in the Energy Systems Analysis 
Department and has assisted with organizing this workshop. After joining Sandia in 1994, he performed 
research and development on high-temperature solar thermal technologies.  His systems analysis work has 
supported DOE solar program planning and technology evaluations and a National Academy of Sciences 
review of the technology. He is interested in improving analytical support of energy issues for policy makers 
and in the complex tradeoffs between energy cost, reliability, safety, security, and sustainability. He holds a 
Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Minnesota.   
John E. Kelly is Deputy Director for Advanced Nuclear Energy Programs. He leads Sandia’s 
efforts to develop advanced concepts for space nuclear power, Generation IV reactors, nuclear-assisted 
hydrogen generation, proliferation-resistant fuel cycles, and fusion materials.  During his 24 years at Sandia, 
he has been engaged in a broad spectrum of nuclear reactor safety research and national security programs 
for DOE and NRC.  In the reactor safety field, his main interests have been in thermal hydraulics, severe 
accidents, and probabilistic risk assessment.  In the national security arena, he contributed to national efforts 
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to assess the safety and technical viability of tritium production technologies.  He also managed the 
development of advanced modeling and simulation tools and high-performance computing systems.   
Peter H. Kobos is a Staff Economist, Office of the Chief Economist. He has a B.S. in Biology 
from Hobart College, a M.S. in Economics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and a Ph.D. in 
Ecological Economics from RPI. Previously, he served as a consultant to Sandia, and briefly with the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis developing energy economic and policy models. His 
current research interests are system dynamics, energy consumption in developing countries, learning in 
technological innovation, and emerging technology cost parameterization. 
Glenn Kuswa is a physicist who earned his Ph.D. in magnetic confinement fusion at the University 
of Wisconsin. He has managed or conducted research in plasma and particle beam diagnostics, particle 
accelerators, and inertial confinement fusion. He has led groups at Sandia on Future Options, Technology 
Transfer, Business Development, Laboratory Assessments, and Nuclear Weapons Surveillance. He served 
the Department of Energy during three two-year assignments: Program Manager in Inertial Confinement 
Fusion, Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs,; and study manager with the 
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. He is author or co-author of numerous publications and presentations. 
His current interests center on energy production issues and related resources. 
Andrew Scholand is Deputy Team Lead of N-ABLE, the NISAC (National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center) Agent Based Laboratory for Economics. He, along with Team Lead Mark 
Ehlen, has used N-ABLE to study endogenous, market-driven adaptations to proposed policy changes, such 
as residential real-time pricing of electric power in California. He is particularly interested in how policy, 
through both first order effects and unanticipated consequences, can evolve system resilience to 
infrastructure disruptions. Andy has a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Georgia Tech, an M.S. in 
Electrical Engineering from King’s College London, and a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Worcester 
Polytechic Institute. 
Les Shephard is Vice President of Energy, Information, and Infrastructure. He leads Sandia’s 
energy research programs, which include fundamental research as well as support for applied programs, 
such as the Yucca Mountain Project. Previously, he spent 18 years in the nuclear waste program areas at 
Sandia, becoming the Director of Nuclear Waste Management Programs (1995,) where he led the scientific 
and engineering efforts resulting in the certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (1998). He then moved 
to the Geoscience and Environment Center prior to becoming Executive Staff Director (2000).  Most 
recently, he served as Director of the Stockpile Resources Center. He received a Ph.D. in 
Geological/Geophysical Oceanography from Texas A&M University, an M.S. in Geological/Geophysical 
Oceanography from Texas A&M University, and a B.S. in Geology from the State University of New York. 
Marjorie (Margie) L. Tatro is Director of the Energy, Infrastructure and Knowledge Systems 
Center, where she leads a group of approximately 260 people working to make the nation’s energy and air 
transportation systems safer, more secure, and more reliable. She is responsible for a portfolio of programs 
that include a $12M fossil energy program, a $40M renewable and energy storage program, and $5M of 
infrastructure programs (energy and transportation). She holds BS and MS degrees in mechanical 
engineering, and has been at Sandia since 1985, working in renewable energy research, facilities design, 
software design, and energy reliability groups. She is a member of the Central New Mexico Section of the 
Society of Women Engineers, as well as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and has served on 
the Board of Directors of the New Mexico Engineering Foundation. 
Steve Thomas is manager of the Computational Sciences and Mathematics Research Department 
in Livermore, California, and manager for energy systems analysis with Sandia’s hydrogen energy program. 
His interests include developing the systems science base for long-term planning and policy analysis for 
national energy security. Special interests include: simulation-enabled robust analysis and planning; 
hydrogen technology R&D investment and future energy infrastructure adaptability; and electric power grid 
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bottlenecks and reliability. Steve’s career in engineering systems R&D includes several years each at AT&T 
Bell Labs and Mobil (Oil) Research. He holds a Ph.D. in computer science, and degrees in engineering 
science and electrical engineering. 
Vincent Tidwell is a Principal Member of the Technical Staff in the Geohydrology Department. He 
is engaged in several technology development projects focused on water resource development and 
management. Working with local, state and federal water management teams, he is developing a decision 
support model aimed at engaging the public in the water planning process. He is also exploring the use of 
Time Domain Reflectometery as a novel means of measuring stream stage, channel depth, and salinity in 
real-time on perennial and ephemeral streams. He is also developing modeling tools to evaluate the security 
risk posed to water distribution systems and optimization technologies to prioritize mitigation strategies. 
Finally, he is involved with volunteer agencies striving to bring safe drinking water to the poor in 
developing countries. 
Craig E. Tyner is currently manager of the Geothermal Research Department at Sandia National 
Laboratories, overseeing Sandia’s geothermal drilling and related programs.  From 2002 to 2004, he 
managed the Solar Programs Department, including Sandia’s Photovoltaics, Concentrating Solar Power 
(CSP), and Solar Buildings Programs, and serving as a member of the Department of Energy’s solar 
management team.  He previously worked in the Concentrating Solar Power Program from 1985 to 2002, 
conducting research in various areas of power tower, solar detoxification, and solar chemistry technology 
(including solar thermochemical hydrogen research) before moving in 1989 to management positions 
overseeing those activities.  From 1995 to 2002, he served as the director of the SunLab (Sandia/NREL 
virtual laboratory overseeing implementation of the CSP program for DOE) management team, coordinating 
SunLab’s technology development, planning, and program implementation activities. He has a Bachelor’s 
degree in chemical engineering from the California Institute of Technology and Master's and Ph.D. degrees 
in the same field from the University of Illinois. 
Paul Veers has worked in wind energy technology at Sandia National Laboratories since joining 
the Labs in 1980, first on the analysis and durability of wind turbine structures, and then on opportunities for 
cost of energy reduction. He has conducted research on various aspects of wind systems including 
atmospheric turbulence simulation, fatigue analysis, structural reliability, aeroelastic tailoring, and the 
evaluation of design safety factors. He has managed the Wind Energy Technology Department at Sandia 
since March 2003, and with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory is part of the U.S. Wind Program 
Laboratory Management Team. He is the Chief Editor for Wind Energy, an international journal for progress 
and applications in wind power published by John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, England, and is a past 
Associate Editor for the Journal of Solar Energy Engineering, Transactions of the ASME.  
John B. Whitley is a Nuclear Engineer, receiving his B.S. Degree at Kansas State University and 
his M.S. and Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. His career at Sandia has included research and 
development of high heat flux materials and components for magnetic fusion devices such as Tokamaks; 
helping develop a science education outreach program for Sandia; and managing an information systems 
group that supported, among other things, a knowledge management program. Shortly after the terrorist’s 
attacks of 9/11, he moved to the Advanced Concepts Group (ACG), which was concentrating on counter-
terrorism studies. His focus areas have been on Radiological Dispersal Devices (dirty bombs), information 
systems for crisis and consequence management, on processes to help the intelligence community “connect 
the dots,” and on enhancing human cognition. His other areas of interest include asymmetric warfare 
(terrorism); nuclear energy issues; the impact and direction of Information Technologies; and resource issues 
such as energy, food and water.  
Gerold Yonas is Principal Scientist and Vice President. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in 
1972, and initiated and directed the particle beam fusion program and the particle beam weapon program. In 
1983, he chaired of the Directed Energy Weapon Panel of the “Fletcher” study that formed the basis for the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program. He later served as the first Chief Scientist and Acting Deputy 
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Director for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). In 1986, he became President of Titan 
Technologies. He rejoined Sandia in 1989 as Director of Laboratory Development, then became Vice 
President of Systems Applications, where he focused on strategic leadership in new initiatives in global 
surveillance, battlefield sensors, and nonnuclear high precision weapons. In 1995, he became VP of 
Systems, Science, and Technology; in 1999, he became Principal Scientist and initiated Sandia’s Advanced 
Concepts Group (ACG), the co-sponsor of this workshop. The ACG investigates potential contributions that 
Sandia National Laboratories might make to solving long-range problems that impact national and global 
security. 
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